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SPECIAL FEATURES
LDC DEBT REDUCTION TECHNIQUES:
DEBT-EQUITY AND DEBT
COLLATERALIZATION
TRANSACTIONS-LEGAL AND
ACCOUNTING IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.
BANKS
ANDREW C. QUALE, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In spite of intense efforts on the part of developing nations,
commercial banks, multilateral financial institutions, the United
States, and other governments over the past seven years, the inter-
national debt crisis persists with few signs of amelioration. Since
the crisis erupted in 1982, total external indebtedness of the devel-
oping countries has increased from $831 billion to an estimated
$1,320 billion in 1988.1 The total external debt of the highly in-
debted countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, C6te d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Ni-
geria, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia)
amounted to $529 billion at the end of 1988.2 Per capita income of
* Copyright, Andrew C. Quale, Jr., 1989. A.B., Harvard College, and LL.B., Harvard
Law School. Mr. Quale is a member of the New York and Massachusetts Bars and practices
international banking and corporate law in New York City with Sidley & Austin. Mr. Quale
is grateful to his colleague, Robert M. Plehn for his fine assistance in the preparation of this
paper. This paper is an expanded version of his article "New Approaches to LDC Debt
Reduction and Disposition: U.S. Legal and Accounting Considerations," which appeared in
the Fall 1989 issue of the International Lawyer. Reprinted with permission of the American
Bar Association.
1. WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK TABLES X (1988-89).
2. Id. at xvii.
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the highly indebted developing countries has fallen as much as five
percent per year during the 1980s, despite six years of economic
expansion in the industrial countries.8 Net financial transfers to
the highly indebted countries, i.e., the excess of new loans over
debt service payments, was an estimated negative eleven billion
dollars in 1987." Not surprisingly, social and political turmoil in
these countries is increasing, as evidenced by the riots in Caracas
in February of 1989 and in Argentina in May of 1989.
Ironically, although the United States has been experiencing a
period of sustained domestic economic growth, it has become, in
recent years, the world's largest debtor nation. At the end of 1987,
the net international investment position of the United States was
a negative $400 billion, as compared to a positive $260 billion for
Japan and $165 billion for Germany. By the end of 1988, U.S.'
debt to the rest of the world had swelled an additional forty per-
cent to $532.5 billion.' Some of the capital flowing into the United
States is coming, of course, from the developing nations. In 1987,
for the first time in fifty years, foreigners earned more in 1987 on
their investments in the United States than Americans earned on
their investments abroad. In brief, the Third World has sunk
deeper into debt, per capita income has declined and developing
countries that should be importing capital to fuel their economic
growth are exporting it to the developed nations.
Fortunately, during this same period, U.S. commercial banks
have substantially increased their capital and dramatically in-
creased their loan-loss reserves. Thus, they are now in a much bet-
ter position to absorb the losses that may result from their Less
Developed Countries (LDC) loans. As a result, after years of tedi-
ous debt reschedulings and forced new money exercises, the com-
mercial banks have now moved beyond the "muddling through"
stage and have begun to actively manage and reduce their debt
portfolios.
Instead of passively holding on to their debt for what could be
forever, banks have begun to pursue aggressively various alterna-
tives in the management of such debt by: 1) selling debt in the
3. WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK ATLAS 6-9 (1988).
4. See DEP'T OF TREASURY, FIRST REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CONCERNING WORLD BANK
STRATEGY AND LENDING PROGRAMS IN DEBTOR COUNTRIEs 18 (Mar. 1989).
5. Mossberg, New 'One-Worlders' are Conservatives, Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1989, at Al,
col. 5; Wessel, U.S. Debt to Rest of World Increased by Forty Percent to $532.5 Billion Last
Year, Wall St. J., June 30, 1989, at A2, col. 3.
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secondary market at increasingly greater discounts; 2) swapping
debt of one sovereign nation for that of another in order to concen-
trate their debt in those countries with which they feel most com-
fortable; 3) converting debt into equity investments in the debtor
nations; and 4) exchanging debt for securitized and/or collateral-
ized debentures or other debt instruments.
Many of the money-center banks generally have been less will-
ing and able than regional banks to sell or trade their LDC debt
due to their relatively weaker capital positions and greater desire
to maintain a long-term financing role in the debtor nations.
Straight debt sales or debt swaps, both of which will result in sub-
stantial losses to a bank, are, accordingly, less attractive to money-
center banks than to regional and foreign banks. By contrast, con-
version of debt to equity interests may be more attractive to
money-center banks than to regional banks because such conver-
sions usually involve less of an accounting loss, require a long-term
interest or commitment to the developing country, and necessitate
a continued presence in the developing country which most re-
gional and foreign banks lack. Thus, in terms of their goals, the
banks tend to fall into two general categories. One group of banks
is prepared to cash out its loan positions and take whatever losses
may result. The other group is more inclined to convert some of its
debt into equity or other debt instruments that may provide a
more profitable and flexible long-term investment than existing
debt and may not involve a substantial and immediate accounting
loss.
The primary goal of the debtor nations is to reduce the
amount of principal and/or the rate of interest payable on their
debt so that their remaining debt can be serviced under reasonably
normal circumstances without an excessively adverse effect on eco-
nomic growth. The amount of reduction of principal and/or inter-
est rates necessary to accomplish this objective will vary greatly
depending upon each country's particular circumstances. No single
scheme for debt relief, if available to banks on a voluntary basis,
would be sufficient to enable the debtor nations to meet their in-
terest obligations comfortably. Nonetheless, significant debt relief
can be accomplished through a combination of debt-equity conver-
sions, debt-forgiveness arrangements similar to the recent Mexican
debt exchange offer (the "Mexican Debt Exchange" or "Ex-
change"), debt buy-backs, and reductions in the rate of interest
payable on the country's debt.
1989-90]
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The quickest and most efficient way of achieving meaningful
debt relief is to enable the debtor nations to capture, to the fullest
extent possible, the discount at which their debt is selling in the
secondary market. Such discount ranges from ninety-four percent
for Peru, down to about thirty-five to forty percent for Chile and
Colombia, the better credit risks in Latin America today.' If banks
are willing (as many have been) to sell their LDC debt at the sub-
stantial discounts prevailing in the secondary market, debtor na-
tions should be encouraged to acquire their own debt, thereby can-
celling and eliminating the accompanying debt service obligations.
Debt-equity conversions and exchanges similar to the Mexican
Debt Exchange are also designed in part to enable debtor nations
to capture some of this discount for their own benefit.
The U.S. debt policy announced by Secretary of the Treasury
Nicholas Brady, on March 10, 1989, recognized publicly, for the
first time, the U.S. Government's belief that debt reduction (i.e.,
forgiveness of part of the principal on the LDC debt) is essential to
the solution of the debt problem.7 To implement the debt reduc-
tion proposal, Secretary Brady encouraged the debtor nations and
their creditor banks to undertake several types of transactions: 1)
debt buy-backs; 2) exchanges of old debt for new longer-term col-
lateralized debt instruments; and 3) debt-equity conversions.
To facilitate such transactions, Secretary Brady called on com-
mercial banks to waive the sharing and mandatory prepayment
provisions and negative pledge clauses of existing loan agreements.
Sharing and mandatory prepayment provisions prohibit debtors
from treating one creditor in preference to other creditors. Such
provisions may limit the debtors' ability to negotiate debt reduc-
tion transactions with individual creditors and thus inhibit the
structuring of such transactions. Negative pledge clauses generally
limit the debtors' freedom to grant collateral security with respect
to existing or new loans. These clauses may limit the debtor na-
tions' ability to obtain new money from lenders through loans (if
such loans cannot be obtained on an unsecured basis). They may
also limit the debtor nations' ability to exchange portions of old
debt for new debt which is secured by collateral. Representatives
of the commercial banks apparently advised the U.S. Treasury De-
partment of their reluctance to waive such important protective
6. LDC Debt News, Ami. Banker, Apr. 10, 1990, at 16, col. 1.
7. Fried & Trezise, Third World Debt: Phase Three Begins, BROOKINos REv. 25-28
(Fall 1989).
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clauses under their loan agreements. The U.S. Treasury subse-
quently indicated that debt reduction techniques of the type con-
templated under the Brady Plan can be implemented without the
necessity of obtaining waivers of protective clauses.
Secretary Brady also proposed that the World Bank and In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) dedicate a portion of their pol-
icy based loans to replenish the reserves used by debtor nations to
reduce their debt burden. With such reserves, the debtor nations
can buy back their debt and finance the purchase of collateral to
secure new collateralized debt instruments issued in exchange for
old debt. Secretary Brady also suggested that the World Bank and
IMF could provide additional financial support to collateralize a
portion of the debtor countries' interest payments on new debt is-
sued in debt reduction transactions.
Both the World Bank and IMF responded positively to Secre-
tary Brady's proposal. The IMF's Executive Board decided that
approximately twenty-five percent of a country's access to IMF re-
sources, under an extended or standby arrangement, can be set
aside to support operations involving principal reduction, such as
debt buy-backs or exchanges.' In addition, the IMF may approve
additional funding, on a case by case basis, of up to forty percent
of a member's quota. This funding must serve as interest support
in connection with debt or debt service reduction operations where
such support would be decisive in facilitating further cost-effective
operations and in catalyzing other resources in support of the oper-
ations.9 Such approvals have already been given to Costa Rica, the
Philippines, and Mexico. The World Bank has decided to allow
certain countries, on a case by case basis, to use up to twenty-five
percent of their three year economic adjustment loans for the pur-
pose of reducing payments of principal and interest on such debt."0
It should be noted, however, that both the World Bank and IMF
have expressed resistance to proposals that they directly guarantee
new instruments created as the result of debt reduction schemes.
The commercial banks have not responded as positively to the
Brady Plan as had been hoped. However, some progress has been
made. After months of bitter negotiations between Mexico and its
8. Executive Board Adopts Guidelines for Role of Fund in Debt Strategy, IMF SuRv.,
May 29, 1989, at 172.
9. Id.
10. Truell, World Bank Sets Rules for Role in Debt Strategy, Wall St. J., June 2, 1989,
at A12, col. 6.
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commercial bank lenders, a debt reduction agreement was signed
by these parties on February 5, 1990. This accord (the "Brady
Mexican Debt Accord"), the first major agreement under the
Brady Plan, reduces Mexico's $48.5 billion medium-term commer-
cial debt by approximately seven billion dollars of principal. It also
saves Mexico about $1.4 billion in annual interest payments and
brings in $1.2 billion in annual new loans during 1990-92. The debt
package provides for debt reduction through two different options
whereby bank creditors can exchange existing debt for new thirty
year bonds. Under one option, new bonds will be issued in ex-
change for existing debt at a thirty-five percent discount and will
pay an interest rate of LIBOR plus thirteen-sixteenths percent.
Under a second option, new bonds will be issued in exchange for
existing debt at face value but the new bonds will bear interest at a
lower, fixed annual interest rate of 6.25 percent. For banks choos-
ing to accept reduced principal or interest, the bonds are collater-
alized by U.S. Treasury zeros. Special funds from the World Bank,
the IMF, the Japanese Government, as well as a commitment from
Mexico will guarantee the payment of the principal of the new
bonds plus eighteen months of interest. These measures will im-
prove the credit quality of the bonds. As of February 1990 bank
creditors holding approximately forty-one percent of the debt (or
about $19.9 billion) which submitted bids for the new bonds opted
for the discount bonds while bank creditors holding forty-nine per-
cent of the debt (or about $23.8 billion) opted for the par value
bonds.
In addition, Venezuela recently reached a preliminary agree-
ment with its bank creditors regarding the basic terms of a debt
reduction proposal. The proposal covers approximately twenty bil-
lion dollars in outstanding loans and offers bank creditors numer-
ous debt reduction options. The first option allows banks to ex-
change their existing debt for new thirty year bonds at a thirty
percent discount. The bonds will bear interest at LIBOR plus thir-
teen-sixteenths percent. The second option allows bank creditors
to exchange their existing debt for new thirty year bonds with an
equivalent face value but which would bear interest at a lower,
fixed annual rate of 6.75 percent. Principal payments under both
types of bonds would be collateralized by U.S. Treasury zero-cou-
pon obligations. Fourteen months of interest payments would be
secured by a cash collateral account established by the Venezuelan
Government. Under both options the Venezuelan Government
would guarantee to make additional payments to the bondholders
[Vol. 21:2
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after six years if oil prices rise beyond a designated level. Such
guarantees of additional payments would be issued in the form of
certificates and would trade separately for the debt reduction
bonds. Under a third option, Venezuela would offer to buy back
existing debt at a discount to be set by the Venezuelan govern-
ment. Such discount is expected to be approximately sixty to sixty-
five percent.
The agreement also contains a temporary interest reduction
option under which bank creditors would receive a seventeen year
bond bearing interest at a rate of five percent in the first two years,
six percent in the next two years and seven percent in the fifth
year. For the remaining twelve year life of the bonds, the interest
rate on the bonds would be LIBOR plus seven-eighths percent. A
collateral account sufficient to cover interest payments for twelve
months would be provided by the Venezuelan Government during
the five year interest reduction period. All of the above programs
will be enhanced by funds provided by the IMF, the World Bank,
the Republic of Venezuela, and other official sources.
The Philippines has also reached a debt reduction accord with
its bank creditors. Under the agreement, the Philippines will buy
back at a fifty percent discount $1.3 billion of the $1.8 billion bank
debt which was tendered to it. In addition, under the plan the
Philippines will receive approximately $600 million in new money.
Finally, Costa Rica is close to consummating a debt reduction
scheme with its bank creditors.1" Under the proposed Costa Rican
transaction, bank creditors will be asked to offer up to sixty per-
cent of their outstanding debt for repurchase by the Costa Rican
Government at a price of approximately $.16 on the dollar. The
banks would receive a twenty year 6.25 percent par bond for the
remaining forty percent of their respective debt. Such bonds would
allow Costa Rica a ten year grace period on interest. Twelve to
eighteen months of the interest but none of the principal would be
collateralized. In addition, Costa Rica would make a twenty per-
cent down payment on its interest arrears and would offer fifteen
year bonds paying interest of LIBOR plus thirteen-sixteenths per-
cent for the remaining amount of its interest arrears. Three years
of interest payments on such bonds would be collateralized. The
proposal also provides for an option for banks which offer less than
sixty percent of their outstanding debt pursuant to the transaction.
11. See Brady Plan Progress Report, INT'L ECON., Feb./Mar. 1990, at 76.
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In such a scenario, the banks would receive twenty-five year, 6.25
percent par bonds which would not be collateralized and which
would allow Costa Rica a fifteen year grace period on interest pay-
ments. Costa Rica would offer the same terms as above with re-
spect to its interest arrears in such scenario except that none of the
interest on the interest arrears bonds would be collateralized.
Despite some success, commercial banks and debtor nations
have found it difficult to reach a consensus on the level of discount.
This may be due in part to their failure to develop structured
transactions that maximize the advantages which may be available
under applicable tax and accounting regulations. It may also be
attributed to the inherent difficulty of the creditor banks to reach
an agreement through their steering committees on a single solu-
tion which is acceptable to all creditors. A more practical solution
would be to permit the market place to develop a number of sepa-
rate solutions which may be better tailored to meet the needs of
different groups of creditors. This paper will analyze, inter alia,
some of the legal and accounting implications of two of the more
innovative approaches to reducing the LDC debt, debt-equity con-
versions and debt exchanges involving new collateralized bonds.
The author hopes that this analysis will assist the debtor nations
and their creditors in developing mutually beneficial approaches to
achieving substantial debt reduction.
II. DEBT-EQUITY CONVERSIONS
A. The Structure of a Debt-Equity Conversion
The simplest, most straightforward debt-equity conversion oc-
curs when a creditor of a company exchanges or converts the debt
which is owed to it by the company for an equity interest in the
company. Such conversions are not common because they require
that the creditor have an interest in acquiring equity in its debtor.
Thus, this kind of conversion will likely occur only where a foreign
parent of a local subsidiary is seeking to capitalize the loans which
it has made to the subsidiary.
Debt-equity conversions are more likely to occur as a two- or
three-part transaction. First, a foreign creditor bank holding public
sector debt sells the debt to the Central Bank of the debtor coun-
try for a local currency equivalent in an amount equal to the face
value of the external debt, or at some pre-established discount.
[Vol. 21:2
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The creditor bank then takes the local currency and uses it to ac-
quire an equity interest in a company in the debtor country. This
is essentially the operation undertaken by Bankers Trust when it
converted approximately sixty million dollars of Chilean public
sector debt (consisting partially of debt which Bankers held in its
portfolio and partially of debt which it purchased from other lend-
ers) into shares of a Chilean pension fund and an affiliated insur-
ance company. Chase Manhattan (Chase) also engaged in a debt-
equity transaction pursuant to which it obtained a non-voting eq-
uity stake in Autolatina, a Brazilian car manufacturer operated as
a joint venture between Volkswagen and Ford. Chase swapped
$200 million of Brazilian bank debt, previously acquired on the
secondary market for other purposes, in exchange for its equity
share in Autolatina.
Some bank lenders may not be interested in converting the
debt they hold into equity and, indeed, may be prohibited from
doing so by applicable banking regulations. A three-step transac-
tion involving a multinational corporation may instead be effected.
The foreign creditor bank initially sells public sector (or possibly
even private sector) debt to a multinational company, usually at a
significant discount (depending upon the particular country in-
volved). The multinational corporation subsequently exchanges,
usually with the debtor nation's central bank, the dollar denomi-
nated debt for local currency equal in amount to the face value of
the debt exchanged, or at a fixed or auction-determined discount.
Finally, the multinational company invests the local currency in a
domestic company, which may well be its own subsidiary.
B. United States Banking Laws and Regulations Affecting
Debt-Equity Conversions
A U.S. banking organization's acquisition of an equity interest
in a foreign company through a debt-equity conversion or other-
wise may be subject to the Federal Reserve Act ("FRA"),'2 the
Bank Holding Company Act ("BHCA"),18 and Regulations K14 and
Y15 of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the
"Board"). Pursuant to Section 25 of the FRA, a member bank may
12. 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-631 (1988).
13. Id. §§ 1841-1850.
14. 12 C.F.R. §§ 211.1-211.45 (1988).
15. Id. §§ 225.1-225.43.
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invest directly in Edge Act Corporations16 and Agreement Corpo-
rations.1 7 Since a member bank generally may not directly own eq-
uity investments in foreign corporations, the acquisition of stock
by a U.S banking organization usually must be effected through
such Edge Act or Agreement Corporations or through one bank's
holding company ("BHC").
Section 4(c)(13) of the BHCA permits BHCs to acquire shares
of any foreign company that:
does no business in the United States except as an incident to
its international or foreign business, if the Board by regulation
or order determines that, under the circumstances and subject
to the conditions set forth in the regulation or order, the exemp-
tion would not be substantially at variance with the purposes of
[the BHCA] and would be in the public interest.18
Section 25(a) of the FRA authorizes Edge Act Corporations to
engage in activities overseas which the Board considers to be usual
in connection with the business of banking in foreign countries."'
Edge Act Corporations may also, with the consent of and subject
to the regulations of the Board, own shares of any foreign company
provided that such company is "not engaged in the general busi-
ness of buying or selling goods . . . in the United States and [is]
not transacting any business in the United States except such as in
the judgment of the Board . . .may be incidental to its interna-
tional or foreign business ... "'0
The Board has issued extensive regulations implementing the
foregoing provisions of the FRA and the BHCA in Regulation K.2
Since Regulation K governs most debt-equity conversions, the fol-
lowing is a detailed description of its pertinent provisions.
In addition to Section 4(c)(13), several other provisions of the
BHCA may be relevant to the acquisition of an equity interest in a
foreign company. Section 4(c)(6) of the BHCA permits a BHC to
hold no more than five percent of the outstanding voting stock of
any company, irrespective of the nature of its business and where
it engages in such business.2 Additionally, Section 4(c)(7) permits
16. 12 U.S.C. § 615(c) (1980).
17. Id. § 601.
18. Id. § 1843.
19. Id. §§ 611-631.
20. Id. § 615(c).
21. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5 (1988).
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1988).
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a BHC to hold shares (without any percentage limitation) of an
investment company, provided that such company is engaged only
in the business of investing in securities, and that it does not hold
more than five percent of the outstanding voting stock of any
company.2 8
Finally, a U.S. banking organization may acquire an equity in-
terest in a company without limitation as to the nature of the busi-
ness of such company or the percentage of voting stock being ac-
quired, if such acquisition is necessary to prevent a loss on a "debt
previously contracted" ("dpc"). This exception to the general lim-
its on the acquisition by banking organizations of equity interests
in companies is found in the National Bank Act,2 the FRA with
respect to Edge Act corporations,2 ' the BHCA,26 Regulations K27
and Y, 28 and various state banking laws.
C. Regulation K
On February 18, 1988, the Board announced a major liberali-
zation of Regulation K. This change was designed to facilitate eq-
uity investments by U.S. banks in foreign countries through the
use of debt-equity conversions.29 This amendment expanded the
scope of an August 1987 amendment to Regulation K30 which per-
mitted banks, through debt-equity swaps, to own up to one hun-
dred percent of nonfinancial companies acquired from the govern-
ment of a heavily indebted developing country. But the prior
liberalization, which permitted banks to buy privatized companies,
had been widely criticized as being of limited use and perhaps even
misguided in its ultimate effect. The new amendment extends the
authority, already generally available to banks under Regulation
K, to make certain equity investments through debt-equity
conversions.
23. Id. § 1843(c)(7).
24. Id. §§ 21-216.
25. Id. § 615(c).
26. Id. § 1843(c)(2).
27. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(e) (1988).
28. Id. § 225.12(b).
29. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f) (1987), amended by 53 Fed. Reg. 5,363 (1988).
30. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f) (1986), amended by 52 Fed. Reg. 30,914 (1987).
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1. General Equity Investment Authority
Regulation K sets forth the Board's long-standing policy re-
garding foreign investments made by BHCs, member banks, and
Edge Act and Agreement corporations (which are collectively de-
fined in Regulation K, and will be referred to hereinafter, as "In-
vestors"). Pursuant to the BHCA and the Edge Act, such foreign
investment should be limited primarily to organizations whose ac-
tivities are "confined to those of a banking or financial nature and
those that are necessary to carry on such activities."'"
2. "Permissible Activities"
Regulation K sets forth a list of those activities which are con-
sidered "usual in connection with the transaction of banking or
other financial operations abroad," 2 and which are considered to
be "permissible activities." These include:
1) commercial and other banking activities;
2) commercial and consumer finance;
3) lease financing;
4) providing investment, financial or economic advisory
services;
5) data processing;
6) managing a mutual fund which does not exercise managerial
control over the firms in which it invests;
7) management consulting;
8) underwriting or distributing securities outside the United
States; and
9) activities which the Board has determined to be closely re-
lated to banking under Section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA.
In addition to these listed permissible activities, the Board,
upon application by an Investor, may approve other activities. It
will approve them if it finds that they are banking or financial in
nature, or if it finds that other financial institutions in the foreign
country in question engage in such activities. The Board will also
31. Id. § 211.5 (a).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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approve activities of an Investor if it determines that for competi-
tive reasons Investors should also be permitted to engage in such
activities.
3. Eligible Investment Levels or Categories
An Investor may acquire up to one hundred percent of the
voting stock of a foreign company provided that ninety-five per-
cent or more of its activities are listed as permissible activities or
have been specifically determined to be permissible by the Board.
An Investor may also acquire lesser amounts of voting stock in a
company even though the company engages, to a significant extent,
in non-permissible activities. More specifically, under Regulation
K, an Investor may:
1) acquire more than fifty percent of the voting stock of a for-
eign entity or acquire control of such entity (a "subsidiary" invest-
ment), provided that at least ninety-five percent of such entity's
assets or revenues relate to permissible activities that are enumer-
ated in Regulation K or have been determined by the Board to be
permissible;
2) acquire twenty percent or more of the voting stock of a for-
eign entity but not a controlling interest (a "joint venture" invest-
ment), provided that at least ninety percent of the assets or reve-
nues of such company relate to permissible activities;
3) acquire less than twenty percent of a foreign entity (a
"portfolio investment") irrespective of what activities the company
engages in, provided that the aggregate amount of all such portfo-
lio investments by the Investor does not exceed the Investor's capi-
tal plus surplus.
4. Requirement of Divestiture
An Investor is required to divest an investment (unless the
Board authorizes retention) if the company in which the invest-
ment is made: 1) engages in the general business of selling goods,
wares, merchandise, or commodities in the United States; 2) en-
gages directly or indirectly in other business in the United States
that would not be permitted to an Edge Act Corporation; or 3)
engages in impermissible activities to an extent not permitted by
the regulations. Thus, in addition to making sure that the com-
pany in which an Investor seeks to invest fits within one of the
1989-901
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eligible investment categories, an Investor must also make sure
that such company's activities in the United States are narrowly
circumscribed.
Even if a foreign company's activities in the United States ex-
ceed such limits so that investment in such company would not be
permitted under Regulation K, an Investor can always hold up to
five percent of the voting stock of such company pursuant to Sec-
tion 4(c)(6) of the BHCA regardless of its activities.
5. Notice and Consent Requirements
Depending upon the magnitude and nature of the proposed
investment, an Investor's acquisition will be subject to the Board's
general consent, its prior notice or specific consent procedure. As-
suming that an Investor's proposed investment fits within one of
the eligible investment categories described above, no prior notice
of the proposed investment need be given to the Board if the in-
vestment in the entity does not exceed the lesser of fifteen million
dollars or five percent of the bank's capital plus surplus.
An investment that fits within one of the three investment
categories (subsidiary, joint venture or portfolio), but exceeds the
level permitted for general consent, may be made pursuant to the
prior notice procedure. Under this procedure, the Investor must
give the Board forty-five days prior notice of its intention to make
such an investment, during which time the Board may state its
objection.
An Investor must seek the specific consent of the Board if its
proposed acquisition does not come within the general consent or
prior notice provisions. Consent is essentially required where an
Investor seeks to acquire more than a portfolio investment in a
company whose activities are not included within the Board's list
of permissible activities.
D. The February 1988 Amendment
The February 1988 amendment liberalized the authority of
BHCs to make equity investments in developing countries through
debt-equity conversions by: 1) increasing the amount of equity
ownership a BHC may have in a nonfinancial company; 2) permit-
ting the BHC to provide loans, in addition to equity, to such com-
pany; 3) extending the time period during which the equity invest-
[Vol. 21:2
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ment may be retained by the BHC; and 4) liberalizing the general
consent procedures.
1. Permissible Equity Investments
In addition to the investments permitted under other provi-
sions of Regulation K, a BHC may now make the following equity
investments through a debt-equity conversion:
1) up to one hundred percent of the shares of any foreign com-
pany, if the shares are acquired from the government of the coun-
try, its agencies or instrumentalities (i.e., a privatization of a pub-
lic sector company), and
2) up to forty percent of the shares of any private sector com-
pany, subject to the following conditions: a) the BHC may acquire
more than twenty-five percent of the voting shares of such com-
pany only if another shareholder or control group of shareholders
not affiliated with the BHC owns a larger block of voting shares of
such company; and b) the BHC may not have a greater representa-
tion on the board of directors or management committees of the
foreign company than is proportional to the shares it holds in such
company.
By permitting a BHC to own up to twenty-five (and under cer-
tain circumstances up to forty) percent of the voting shares of the
foreign company, the Board enabled BHCs to maintain not only
portfolio, but "operational" investments in private sector nonfi-
nancial companies. The Board believes that BHCs will be able to
have an important voice in the management of the companies
through proportionate, non-controlling representation on the com-
panies' boards of directors. The Board feels that a BHC should be
able to protect its investment in a nonfinancial company without
having sole operational control over the company-a control which
a BHC is ill-equipped to exercise. Also, possession of twenty per-
cent or more of the shares of nonfinancial companies will allow
BHCs to use consolidation or equity accounting, as opposed to cost
accounting, with respect to such investments.
2. Permissible Debt Financing
If a BHC acquires twenty percent or more of the voting shares
of a nonfinancial, private sector company, it will not be permitted
to extend loans or other forms of financing to the same company in
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excess of fifty percent of the total loans or extensions of credit to
that company.
3. Permissible Holding Period
BHCs will be permitted to retain investments made pursuant
to debt-equity conversions for a period of two years beyond the
end of any reparation restriction period established by the host
country but in no event for more than fifteen years. This holding
period will apply to investments in both public and private sector
companies. Its imposition reflects the Board's view that invest-
ments of twenty percent or more in the voting stock of nonfinan-
cial companies should be temporary. It also upholds the Board's
general objective of maintaining the separation between banking
and commerce. The divestment requirement at the end of the
holding period is not applicable, however, to investments otherwise
permissible under Regulation K, even if such investments resulted
from debt-equity conversions.
4. General Consent Procedures
The Board grants a general consent to investments made pur-
suant to the February 1988 amendment if the total amount in-
vested does not exceed the greater of fifteen million dollars or one
percent of the equity of the BHC. Prior notice to, or the specific
consent of, the Board is required: 1) if a country's debt-equity con-
version program requires the BHC to invest new money after con-
verting debt obligations to equity; 2) if the amount of such new
money exceeds fifteen million dollars; or 3) if the investment is to
be made through an insured bank or its subsidiary.
5. Investments to be Held Through the Holding Company
Debt-for-equity investments in nonfinancial companies must
be held through a BHC and not directly by a bank or a subsidiary
of a bank. The Board sought to protect banks from the potential
risks of investments in commercial and industrial companies, and
has made it clear that the federal safety net does not apply to non-
banking activities. The Board is willing, however, to grant excep-
tions to this general requirement on a case by case basis if the
bank can demonstrate that there is a special reason (e.g., local legal
requirements) why it, rather than a BHC, must hold the invest-
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ment in the nonfinancial company.
6. Private Sector Debt Not Eligible for Debt-Equity Conversion
Despite some sentiment to the contrary, the Board has limited
application of the liberalized investment rules to equity invest-
ments made through the conversion of sovereign debt, thus exclud-
ing the swapping of private sector debt. In support of its position,
the Board noted that a bank can already convert private sector
debt to an equity investment through the use of the "debt previ-
ously contracted" exception, whereas, according to the Board, sov-
ereign debt is not eligible for such conversion.
7. Some Observations on the February 1988 Amendment
Although the February 1988 amendment provides a useful lib-
eralization of Regulation K, the ability of banks to undertake debt-
equity conversions has not been significantly enhanced. BHCs may
now own up to twenty-five percent of the voting stock of a nonfi-
nancial company (or up to forty percent if another stockholder
holds a larger block), whereas previously the BHCs were limited to
less than twenty percent. The power to acquire this relatively
small additional amount of voting stock has been coupled with lim-
itations on the permissible holding period of the investment, the
amount of debt financing that may also be provided, the manner in
which the investment may be held, and the type of debt that is
eligible for conversion.
The Board, in its August 1987 amendment, permitted BHCs
to acquire one hundred percent of a public sector company pursu-
ant to a debt-equity conversion. Since public sector companies are
more likely to be poorly managed than private sector companies,
the acquisition of a one hundred percent interest in a private sec-
tor company would present less commercial risk to a BHC than a
public sector company and should, a fortiori, also be permitted.
Such treatment would be consistent with the purpose of the "dpc"
exception described below, namely, to enable a bank to exchange
debt for an equity interest, without a limit on the percentage of
voting stock, if the bank believes such exchange is a reasonable
step toward collecting on its loan. The "dpc" exception is a very
limited but well-established departure from the general principle
of the separation of banking and commerce. Therefore, the Board
would have ample precedent for permitting BHCs to acquire up to
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one hundred percent of private sector as well as public sector
companies.
E. Other Legal Bases for Holding an Equity Investment in
Foreign Companies
Assuming that an Investor cannot make an investment eligible
under the investment categories of the newly amended Regulation
K, it can nonetheless rely on several alternative legal bases to ac-
quire equity in a foreign company. The most flexible of these is the
"dpc" exception. This permits an Investor to acquire an equity in-
vestment in exchange for a "debt previously contracted." Of more
limited use to an Investor are the two exceptions to the general
prohibitions of the BHCA that permit an Investor to acquire di-
rectly, or indirectly through an investment company, up to five
percent of the voting stock of a company.
1. The "Debt Previously Contracted" Exception
The "dpc" exception permits a banking organization to avoid
limitations otherwise imposed by banking laws by acquiring up to
one hundred percent of the voting stock of a company in exchange
for a "debt previously contracted." The "dpc" exceptions are
found in Regulation K, the BHCA, Regulation Y, the FRA, and in
state law.
2. Regulation K
Pursuant to the "dpc" exception set forth in Section 211.5(e)
of Regulation K, equity interests acquired in exchange for "debts
previously contracted" are not subject to the limitations of Regula-
tion K, provided that: 1) such equity is acquired in order to "pre-
vent a loss on a debt previously contracted in good faith"; and 2)
such equity interests are disposed of no later than two years after
their acquisition, unless the Board authorizes retention for a longer
period.
The "dpc" exceptions set forth in the BHCA and Regulation
Y are very similar to that of Regulation K except that they permit
the Board to authorize the BHC to retain conversion generated
shares for a maximum period of five years, whereas Regulation K
contains no such absolute limit. By means of the "dpc" exception,
an Investor may acquire an unlimited amount of the voting stock
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of a foreign company, irrespective of whether such company en-
gages in non-"permissible" activities such as manufacturing, min-
ing or tourism.
Whether the "dpc" exception is available depends upon the
facts of a particular case. Generally, this provision has been used
to permit an Investor's conversion of debt into equity of the same
debtor, or into the equity which served as collateral for the debt in
question. Regulation K, however, does not on its face preclude a
conversion into equity of a third party. Nonetheless, -some mem-
bers of the Board have apparently taken a somewhat restrictive
view of the "dpc" exception. They suggest that it may not be used
to acquire equity in exchange for the debt of a sovereign nation.
Their reasoning appears to be twofold. First, the "dpc" exception
should be limited to debtors that are bankrupt or have been de-
clared in default. Although some debtor nations may be in arrears
on their obligations, they have not been declared in default. There-
fore, the debtor nations' situation should not be considered so seri-
ous so as to justify "dpc" treatment. Second, some members of the
Board's staff have expressed concern as to whether the remainder
of a banking organization's debt portfolio of a particular debtor
country should be written down if part of it has been converted to
equity "in order to prevent a loss."
The language of Regulation K, however, does not necessarily
compel such a restrictive interpretation. If a banking organization
were to sell a particular loan in the secondary market or swap it for
the debt of another Third World debtor it would incur a loss
which, depending on the discount at which such debt is selling,
may be substantial irrespective of whether the debtor was bank-
rupt or had been declared in default. Moreover, if the banking or-
ganization were to incur a loss on the transaction, it would not nec-
essarily be required to write down the rest of its portfolio of such
debt. Thus, by effecting a conversion of debt to an equity invest-
ment, a banking organization not only might be able to "prevent a
loss," but would also not necessarily have to write down any re-
maining debt of the same debtor held in its portfolio.
3. The National Bank Act
Even if the Board will not permit a BHC to undertake a debt-
equity conversion pursuant to the "dpc" exception, the bank itself
may be able to effect such a transaction directly. Ordinarily, debt-
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equity conversions are effected either at the holding company
level, i.e., by the BHC itself, or by a non-bank subsidiary of the
BHC. If, however, the debt is held by the bank and is converted by
it, then, in the case of a national bank, the National Bank Act and
the regulations of the Office of Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC") will apply and, in the case of a state bank, state laws and
regulations will apply. The OCC has interpreted the "incidental
powers" clause"4 of the National Bank Act to permit debt for eq-
uity exchanges if the bank believes in good faith that such an ex-
change is a reasonable and appropriate step toward collecting a
bank's loans.3 5 The OCC has also found that a national bank's
power to hold real property received in satisfaction of a "debt pre-
viously contracted" enables it to convert debt for equity where the
equity in question is in a real estate holding company.6 The OCC
is apparently prepared to give considerable weight to a bank's de-
termination that the debt for equity exchange is reasonably neces-
sary to salvage the bank's assets.
The OCC's interpretation of the National Bank Act as permit-
ting "dpc" transactions is elaborated upon in two recent "No Ob-
jection" letters issued in 19871" and 1988.38 The former involved an
investment in a Mexican holding company whose sole asset was a
Mexican hotel and, the latter involved an investment in a Chilean
insurance company.
If a national bank undertakes a "dpc" transaction pursuant to
its inherent powers under the National Bank Act, neither approval
nor a "No Objection" letter is required from the OCC. Neverthe-
less, the interpretation set forth in the "No Objection" letter can
provide useful guidance to banks making equity investments rely-
ing on such powers.
4. New York State Banking Law
Under New York law, a bank "may invest in, and have and
exercise all rights of ownership with respect to, so much of the cap-
ital stock of any other corporation as may be specifically author-
34. 12 U.S.C. J 24 (1988).
35. Id.
36. Id. § 29.
37. No Objection Letter No. 87-10, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 84,039 (Nov. 27,
1987).
38. No Objection Letter No. 88-7, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,047 (May 20, 1988).
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ized by the laws of [New York] or by resolution of the banking
board upon a three-fifths vote of all its members."89 Additionally,
a bank or trust company may acquire stock in settlement or re-
duction, or a loan, or advance or credit or in exchange for an
investment previously made in good faith and in the ordinary
course of business, where the acquisition of stock is necessary in
order to minimize or avoid a loss in connection with any such
loan, advance or credit or investment previously made in good
faith.40
The New York State Banking Department takes a flexible at-
titude in permitting the acquisition of stock for a debt previously
contracted. If the bank reasonably believes that the acquisition of
equity in exchange for debt is necessary in order to minimize or
avoid a loss in connection with a loan, and the transaction is not a
subterfuge, the Banking Department will not object.
5. Section 4(c)(6) of the BHCA
Assuming a banking organization cannot effect a debt-equity
conversion in reliance either upon Regulation K (because the tar-
get company is engaged in more than incidental business activities
in the United States) or on the "dpc" exception, it still will be
permitted to acquire up to five percent of the voting stock of any
company, pursuant to Section 4(c)(6) of the BHCA. This exception
is self-executing and accordingly requires no prior notice to, or
consent by, the Board. The exception is available irrespective of
the nature of the business in which the company is engaged or the
extent of its activities in the United States. Such investments,
however, are required to be passive and may not involve active
participation by an Investor in the management of the company.
6. Effecting Debt-Equity Conversions Through Investment Com-
panies
Section 4(c)(7) of the BHCA permits a BHC to hold up to one
hundred percent of the shares of an investment company which is
not engaged in any business other than investing in securities, pro-
vided that such securities do not represent more than five percent
39. N.Y. Banking Law § 97(5) (McKinney Supp. 1990).
40. Id.
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of the outstanding voting stock of any company. No comparable
provision is contained in Regulation K, and the Board has not
been called upon to determine what rules would pertain to a
BHC's acquisition of shares in an investment company which in-
vests solely in foreign equity securities.
Since a BHC may acquire up to twenty-five (and under certain
circumstances up to forty) percent of the voting shares of a nonfi-
nancial company, presumably a BHC could acquire shares in an
investment company which holds an equivalent percentage amount
of voting stock of a company. Open to question is whether a BHC
may hold up to twenty-five (or forty) percent of the shares of an
investment company which, in turn, holds any amount of the vot-
ing stock of a company. The Board's adverse reaction to such a
proposal, and variations thereof, may depend upon the extent to
which the BHC has excessive operational control over the company
in which the investment company is investing. The Board may be
more receptive to a proposal where through the use of the invest-
ment company vehicle, the BHC is indirectly investing in the tar-
get company with one or more substantial joint venture partners
which can bring managerial and/or technical expertise to the
investment.
F. U.S. Accounting Treatment of Debt-Equity Conversions
1. Debt-Equity Swaps
In view of the partial liberalization of Regulation K, perhaps
the most significant U.S. regulatory obstacle to debt-equity conver-
sion is U.S. accounting treatment. The proper accounting treat-
ment for a debt-equity conversion has been the subject of consid-
erable uncertainty and controversy. Recently, however, the
Accounting Standards Executive Committee ("AcSEC") of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA")
and the AICPA Banking Committee reached substantial agree-
ment on the appropriate treatment and released AcSEC Practice
Bulletin No. 4 dealing with "Accounting for Foreign Debt-Equity
Swaps.""
Under the AcSEC Bulletin, a debt-equity swap will be treated
as an exchange transaction of a monetary asset for a nonmonetary
41. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ExEcunvE COMMI AND COMMITTEE ON BANKING, AMERI-
CAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, PRAc. BULL. No. 4 (May 1988).
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asset, the latter reflected at its "fair value" on the books of the
bank or BHC as of the date the transaction is agreed to by both
parties. The AcSEC Bulletin states that to determine "fair value,"
one should consider the fair value of the consideration given up,
i.e., the old debt, as well as the fair value of the assets received,
i.e., the equity investment. This is especially true if the value of
the consideration given up is not readily determinable or may not
be a good indicator of the value received. The AICPA notes that
since the secondary market for debt of financially troubled coun-
tries is thin, that market may not be the best indicator of the value
of the equity investment received. Therefore, the AICPA commit-
tees concluded that to determine the fair value of the equity re-
ceived in a debt-equity conversion, both the secondary market
price of the debt given up and the fair value of the equity invest-
ment received should be considered. According to the AICPA, the
following factors must be considered in determining current fair
value:
1) similar transactions for cash;
2) estimated cash flows from the equity investment received;
3) market value, if any, of similar equity investments; and
4) restrictions, if any, affecting payment of dividends, sale of
the investment or repatriation of capital.
If the fair value of the equity investment received is less than
the book value of the debt, the resulting loss should be recognized
and charged to the allowance for loan losses. The recorded loss
should include any discounts from the official exchange rate that
are imposed as a transaction fee. All other fees relating to the
debt-equity conversion should be charged to expenses, rather than
capitalized.
Will the recognition of a loss in a debt-equity conversion con-
taminate the remainder of a bank's loan portfolio with respect to
that debtor or country? The AcSEC Bulletin does not require that
the remainder of the bank's debt be written down to the same
value. The AICPA notes, however, that in accordance with Gener-
ally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), a financial institu-
tion's loan portfolio should be carried at amortized historical cost
less loan write-offs and the allowance for loan losses, provided that
the institution has the ability and intent to hold the loans until
their maturity. Thus, the bank need not mark down such debt to
its "fair value" simply because of a debt-equity conversion. Loan
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write-offs and loan loss allowances must be taken based on man-
agement's judgment of the ultimate collectibility of the loans in
the normal course of business. The recognition of a loss on a debt-
equity conversion should be a factor considered by management in
its periodic assessment of the adequacy of its allowance for loan
losses. If, however, management demonstrates its intention to dis-
pose of loans prior to maturity, the loan should be carried at cost
or fair value, whichever is lower. Thus, the recognition of a loss on
a debt-equity conversion will not require a bank to write down the
remainder of its loans to the same borrower, but should be taken
into account by the bank in determining the adequacy of its allow-
ance for loan losses.
In practice, will this proposed treatment require a significant
write-down of the value of the equity asset received? If the "fair
value" of such equity must take into account the secondary market
value of the debt given up, as well as the U.S. dollar value of a
local currency-denominated equity interest which is not readily
convertible into hard currency, the write-down will likely involve a
significant loss. Thus, for an equity investment in Mexico, acquired
in exchange for debt selling at approximately forty percent of par,
the loss might well be twenty-five to forty-five percent. If such
losses ensue, some banks may be discouraged from undertaking
debt-equity conversions until their reserves are adequate to absorb
such losses. Even then, they may prefer to hold on to a debt or,
alternatively, to sell it, realize the loss and eliminate the worry in-
volved in their exposure to the developing country in question.
2. Debt-for-Debt Swaps
The market among banks for debt-for-debt swaps was severely
dampened by both the AICPA's "Notice to Practitioners" of May
198542 and the OCC Banking Circular 200 ("0CC Circular"), 8
which provided that a swap of loans owed by different debtors rep-
resented an exchange of monetary assets that should be accounted
for at fair value. The OCC Circular further stated that, for loan
swaps involving loans to debtors in foreign countries which are cur-
rently experiencing financial difficulties "[i]t is presumed the esti-
42. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, NOTICE TO PRACTITIONERS
(May 1985).
43. Accounting Guidelines for Bank Loans, 4 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 51,145
(May 22, 1985).
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mated fair value would be less than the respective fair value of the
loans and other consideration [given up]. Assuming the general
presumption is not overcome, this would result in a loss on the
swap."
Now that many banks have established substantial reserves
for their Third World debt and have indicated a willingness to re-
alize losses in dealing with such debt, there will likely be more
debt-for-debt swapping. If, however, the banks would realize an
equivalent loss in the swap as in an actual sale of the debt, they
may prefer to sell, rather than swap, their debt.
III. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR STRUCTURING EQUITY INVESTMENTS
To avoid some of the limitations on acquiring voting stock of
nonfinancial entities placed upon U.S. banks by Regulation K and
the BHCA and the restrictions imposed by certain debtor nations
on foreign investment generally, investors may need to consider
some creative structuring techniques. Additionally, banks which
convert their debt with equity investments will want to protect
themselves not only from the vagaries of the profitability of such
investments, but also from the risk of devaluation of the local cur-
rency. To reduce these risks a bank might concentrate on invest-
ments that have a high foreign exchange earning capacity, such as
the manufacture of exports and tourist resorts. Another option
might be to obtain insurance, if available, from the Overseas Pri-
vate Investment Corporation and the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (especially for inconvertibility risks).
Such risks, as well as the limitations on acquiring voting stock
imposed by Regulation K and the BHCA, may be alleviated by the
acquisition of a non-voting preferred stock, which has attributes
similar to those of debt, and the adoption of one or more of the
following "bells and whistles":
1) the dividends on the preferred stock could be cumulative
and mandatorily payable as soon as the venture has sufficient
profits;
2) a sinking fund arrangement could be established into which
funds would be deposited for subsequent use in paying dividends
on, and ultimately redeeming, the preferred stock;
3) the issuer of the preferred stock could be an entity within
an affiliated group. The group would be structured so that, even if
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the overall venture were not profitable, the particular entity issu-
ing the preferred stock could be the beneficiary of special contrac-
tual arrangements. These arrangements would assure the entity
sufficient profitability to service the dividends due on such stock;
4) to protect against the devaluation of the local currency, the
dividend and redemption payments might be adjusted or indexed
so as to reflect inflation or changes in exchange rates. Alterna-
tively, the preferred stock could have a bonus dividend which
would compensate for losses due to devaluation. Whether any of
such arrangements will work in a particular country will depend
upon local laws, the regulations applicable to debt-equity conver-
sions, and regulations affecting remittances of foreign exchange
with respect to dividends.
BHCs are generally limited by U.S. regulations to ownership
of up to twenty-five (and under certain circumstances up to forty)
percent of a company's voting stock (assuming the investments are
not banking or financial in nature or are not necessary to prevent a
loss on a debt previously contracted, in which case more voting
stock may be acquired). Therefore, BHCs are logical minority part-
ners for U.S. and other industrial companies which desire to estab-
lish or expand an operation in one of the debtor countries. By sell-
ing a minority equity interest to a bank, an industrial company can
obtain outside financing in local currency (which may be otherwise
difficult) at a relatively reasonable cost. By so doing, the industrial
company can also share the equity risks of investment with a mi-
nority partner with whom they feel comfortable. At the same time,
the bank will feel comfortable being a minority partner of an in-
dustrial company that has operational control over the business
and with which it may well have an existing customer relationship
in the United States.
IV. LDC DEBT EXCHANGE AND COLLATERALIZATION SCHEMES: THE
MEXICAN DEBT EXCHANGE AND SIMILAR DEBT REDUCTION
PROPOSALS
Proposals to turn part of the LDC debt into tradeable securi-
ties on a securities exchange, rather than merely in the informal
secondary market for LDC debt, have been fantasized about for
several years by investment and commercial bankers, and their
lawyers and accountants. Schemes have frequently included credit
enhancement devices, such as guarantees by multilateral financial
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institutions or collateral consisting of U.S. Treasury obligations.
The goal has been to create a new instrument which, fulfilling the
alchemist's dream, has a value in the market place exceeding the
cost or value of its constituent components. The Mexican Debt Ex-
change, although not the only such scheme to see the light of day,
is certainly the most ambitious and noteworthy to date and will be
analyzed below. Other debt exchange proposals, which have
avoided some of the problems encountered in the Mexican Debt
Exchange, are also described below. Most of these proposals are
confidential and, therefore, are not appropriate for explicit discus-
sion in this paper. Nonetheless, some of the tax and accounting
considerations that may be relevant to these proposals will be dis-
cussed in the following sections.
A. The Basic Outline of the Mexican Debt Exchange
Pursuant to an Invitation for Bids,44 Mexico, on January 18,
1988, offered to exchange a new issue of Mexican Collateralized
Floating Rate Bonds Due 2008 ("Bonds"), which are denominated
in U.S. dollars, pay interest at a floating rate and mature in twenty
years, in exchange for certain existing obligations of Mexico out-
standing under its Restructure and New Money agreements. The
Bonds were to be secured, as to principal only, by non-interest
bearing U.S. Treasury obligations ("Zeroes"), which were to be
purchased by Mexico, using its own reserves. The Zeroes were to
be pledged to holders of the Bonds and have a maturity date and
principal amount payable at maturity to match the maturity date
and principal amount of the Bonds. In the event of a default under
the Bonds, a bondholder would not have access to the Zeroes until
the originally scheduled maturity date. At such time, the proceeds
of the Zeroes would be available to pay the principal of the Bonds
at maturity.
Banks desiring to exchange their existing debt for Bonds were
invited to submit bids, on a voluntary basis, to the exchange agent,
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York (Morgan Guar-
anty). In its bids, each bank was asked to specify the principal
44. Invitation from Gustavo Petrocelli, Minister of Finance and Public Credit of the
United Mexican States, to the Banks Party to Mexico's Public Sector Restructure and New
Restructure Agreements and 1983 and 1984 New Money Agreements, to Exchange Existing
Indebtedness for United Mexican States Collateralized Floating Rate Bonds Due 2008 (Jan.
18, 1988).
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amount of eligible existing Mexican debt obligations (the "Eligible
Debt") the bank was willing to tender and the principal dollar
amount of Bonds the bank would accept in exchange for such Eli-
gible Debt. For example, a bank could state in its bid that it was
willing to tender ten million dollars of Eligible Debt and would
accept in exchange therefor Bonds with a principal dollar amount
of seven million dollars, thereby indicating its willingness to accept
a discount of thirty percent.
To enhance their attractiveness to the banks and, ultimately,
to third parties, the Bonds had the following features:
1) the Bonds would pay interest at a margin of one and five-
eighths percent above LIBOR, which was double the margin of
thirteen-sixteenths percent currently being paid by Mexico on the
Eligible Debt;
2) the Bonds would be listed on the Luxembourg stock
exchange;
3) the Bonds, according to Mexico, would not be subject to
future restructurings or reschedulings which might otherwise apply
to its Eligible Debt; and
4) also, neither the Bonds nor the Eligible Debt given in ex-
change would be considered part of any base amount for purposes
of future requests by Mexico for new money.
B. Consents and Waivers
In order to issue the Bonds, it was deemed necessary for Mex-
ico to obtain a waiver of the negative pledge provisions under its
outstanding credit agreements and, in the case of one credit agree-
ment that did not permit an exchange offer, even if unsecured, the
waiver of the mandatory prepayment and sharing provisions. In
addition, it was necessary for Mexico to collateralize certain out-
standing publicly-held bond issues since it was not practicable to
obtain a waiver of the negative pledge provisions relating to such
issues.
C. The Results of the Bid
Mexico and Morgan Guaranty had publicly stated they ex-
pected up to twenty billion dollars of Eligible Debt would be ten-
dered and, projecting that the banks would tender at a forty to
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fifty percent discount, the total amount of new bonds to be issued
was predicted to be as high as ten billion dollars. The results of the
auction were much less dramatic. Over six billion dollars of Eligi-
ble Debt were tendered, but Mexico accepted only those obliga-
tions tendered at an exchange ratio of 74.99 percent or less. As a
result, Mexico accepted $3.67 billion of debt to be exchanged for
$2.56 billion of Bonds. Thus, the average exchange ratio of the ac-
cepted bids was 69.77 percent. Upon completion of the exchange,
Mexico succeeded in reducing its outstanding indebtedness by $1.1
billion, an amount substantially lower than the reduction of ten
billion dollars originally envisioned. Although the results seem dis-
appointing in light of such expectations, the transaction was con-
sidered a moderate success, not only because it reduced Mexico's
debt by $1.1 billion, but also because it showed that debt securi-
tization and collateralization schemes can play a significant role in
the management and reduction of LDC debt.
D. Accounting Treatment of the Mexican Debt Exchange
Perhaps the two most important issues confronting the banks
in evaluating the Mexican Debt Exchange were the accounting
treatment of the exchange and the value that the marketplace put
on the Bonds. The Exchange raised three principal accounting
issues.
1. Accounting Treatment of the Exchange Itself
Price Waterhouse rendered an opinion to Morgan Guaranty on
the appropriate accounting treatment for the transaction, conclud-
ing that the exchange of Eligible Debt for the Bonds should be
treated as an exchange of monetary assets.45 As a result, a bank
would recognize an accounting loss or gain equal to the difference
between the value of the Eligible Debt carried on its books prior to
the transaction and the "fair value"4 of the Bonds received in ex-
change. Such a loss should generally be recorded as a charge to the
allowance for loan losses. The amount of the loss is affected not
only by the discount factor at which a bank exchanges its Eligible
45. Id. app. III, Letter from Price Waterhouse.
46. "Fair value" is normally equal to market value if a broad based, active market ex-
ists. Since it might take some time for such a market for the Bonds to develop, banks might
need to use other appropriate valuation techniques, such as a discounted cash flow analysis,
to determine fair value.
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Debt for the Bonds, but also by the amount by which the fair value
of the Bonds received exceeds the face value of such Bonds.
Some accountants have argued that the Mexican Debt Ex-
change could be treated not as an exchange of monetary assets
with the bonds being registered in the books at "fair value," but
rather as part of a troubled debt restructuring pursuant to Finan-
cial Accounting Standards No. 15, "Accounting by Debtors and
Creditors for Troubled Restructurings" ("FAS No. 15"). 47 If the
exchange of Bonds for Eligible Debt were considered a restructur-
ing of the Eligible Debt, FAS No. 15 would not require a bank to
write down the value of its restructured loan unless the amount of
the loan on its books exceeded the total future cash receipts, in-
cluding both principal and interest, to be received by the bank
pursuant to the restructured terms of the debt. Since the total
payments of principal plus interest over the twenty year life of the
Bonds would clearly exceed the recorded value of the Eligible Debt
on the books of the banks prior to the exchange, the bank would
not be required to recognize a loss.
2. Accounting Treatment of Debt Tendered but Not Accepted by
Mexico
Under GAAP, a bank should carry a loan if the bank has the
intent and ability to hold it until maturity at its historical cost,
less the allowance for loan losses. If, however, management clearly
demonstrates its intent to dispose of a loan or a group of loans
prior to maturity, then such loans should be carried at cost or mar-
ket value, whichever is lower. Price Waterhouse viewed the Mexi-
can Debt Exchange as a unique opportunity. As such, it concluded
that if management does not have a present intent to dispose of
the Eligible Debt other than through the tender offer, the mere act
of tendering Eligible Debt, which is subsequently not accepted by
Mexico, does not necessarily constitute a clear intention to dispose
of such loans prior to maturity.
However, the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) took a contrary view in its Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 75
("SAB No. 75").4' SAB No. 75 states:
47. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ORIGINAL PRO-
NOUNCEMENTS 169 (McGraw-HiU ed. 1986-1987).
48. 53 Fed. Reg. 865 (1988) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 211).
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The tender of the existing loans is an event that must be given
accounting recognition either (i) by writing the loans down to
the price at which the bank has agreed to accept Bonds in the
tender (tender price) or (ii) by increasing, as necessary, the al-
lowance for loan losses to an amount sufficient to result in a net
carrying value of the loans tendered that equals the tender
price.
3. Treatment of Debt Not Tendered to Mexico
Price Waterhouse opined that even though a bank exchanges
part of its Eligible Debt for Bonds and recognizes a loss on the
exchange, the accounting treatment of the bank's untendered Eli-
gible Debt should not change solely because a portion of the bank's
Eligible Debt was exchanged, so long as the bank has the ability
and intent to hold the remaining loans to maturity. SAB No. 75
points out, however, that pursuant to Statement of Financial Ac-
counting Standards No. 5, "Accounting for Contingencies," man-
agement has a continuing responsibility to assess the adequacy of
the allowance for loan losses relative to untendered Mexican debt.
This insures that such allowance is adequate to provide for losses
due to ultimate collectibility, including anticipated losses from the
sale, swap or other exchange of loans.
4. Securities Laws Aspects
The Bonds were issued in registered definitive form. They
were not registered under U.S. securities laws, but were sold to
U.S. citizens pursuant to a private placement, with appropriate
legends and restrictions on transfer. Bonds issued outside the
United States to non-U.S. citizens are prohibited from being sold
within the United States or to U.S. citizens for a period of ninety
days after issuance. The Bonds to be issued to non-U.S. citizens
were initially represented by a single, temporary global bond. Indi-
vidual Bonds were to be issued to non-U.S. citizens ninety days
after the closing date for the transaction, upon appropriate anti-
flowback certifications by such persons.
5. FAS No. 15
As noted above, the Mexican Debt Exchange could have been
treated as a "troubled restructuring" pursuant to FAS No. 15
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thereby avoiding the necessity of the banks' recognizing a current
accounting loss. FAS No. 15 might also be used to reduce the ac-
counting losses on other debt reduction transactions. Under FAS
No. 15, if a bank restructures a debt owed to it by a debtor, a bank
does not have to account for a loss at the time the exchange occurs,
as long as the total future cash receipts, including principal and
interest, to be received by a bank under the terms of the new debt
are at least equal to the amount of the loan recorded on the bank's
books. The bank must write down a loss at the time of the ex-
change only if the total aggregate amount to be received under the
terms of the new debt is less than the recorded book value of the
old debt.
Thus, FAS No. 15 can provide an accounting incentive for
commercial banks to enter into debt restructurings with debtor na-
tions, since it effectively allows them to defer the losses associated
with a restructuring. For example, a bank might exchange debt of
a debtor nation for which it has a book value of one hundred for
new debt that has a par value of sixty-five, a term of six years and
bears interest of ten percent per year. Such exchange could be
treated as a FAS No. 15 restructuring and the bank would incur no
accounting loss on the exchange since the total sum of principal
and interest payments would exceed the original book value of the
loan.
Nevertheless, some U.S. banks are hesitant to take advantage
of the benefits offered by FAS No. 15. The banks fear that al-
though they may not have to currently write down the loss result-
ing from the debt rescheduling, the use of FAS No. 15 in conjunc-
tion with reschedulings may provide a negative signal to the
market. In addition, some accountants have criticized FAS No. 15
on the grounds that the present value of the new asset received in
exchange for the old has decreased and, therefore, the creditor
should be forced to currently realize the loss, rather than defer it
as FAS No. 15 allows.
E. Some Observations on the Mexican Debt Exchange and
Suggestions for Similar Transactions
The Mexican Debt Exchange deserves genuine recognition for
blazing a new trail in the quest for solutions to the debt crisis. A
number of criticisms and comments have, however, been put forth
which should be taken into consideration and evaluated in struc-
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turing other debt reduction transactions:
1) The fact that Mexico itself had to purchase with its own
reserves the Zeroes to collateralize the Bonds renders the scheme
impracticable for most developing countries that have limited
reserves.
2) The requirement by the SEC in SAB No. 75 that Eligible
Debt tendered but not accepted by Mexico be written down to the
tender price, or that sufficient loan-loss reserves be maintained to
reflect a carrying value of such debt equal to the tender price, dis-
couraged some banks from participating in the tender. Neverthe-
less, it is possible to structure debt reduction transactions to avoid
the adverse accounting consequences of such a tender.
3) The transaction could have been structured to qualify as
FAS No. 15 troubled debt restructuring, thereby avoiding the im-
mediate financial accounting loss suffered by banks participating
in the exchange.
4) Mexico was unrealistic in anticipating that banks would
tender their Eligible Debt at a discount which, when combined
with the market discount of the Bonds when issued, would result
in an overall discount in excess of that at which the Eligible Debt
was trading in the secondary market.
5) The interest payable on the Bonds was purely a Mexican
credit risk, depressing the anticipated market price at which the
Bonds would trade. Some credit enhancement, such as a one year
rolling forward guaranty or collateral arrangement, might have
been desirable to support Mexico's interest obligation.
With the financial and credit enhancement support apparently
forthcoming from the World Bank and the IMF, it is expected that
new debt securitization and collateralization schemes will be devel-
oped based in part on credit support from such institutions. In ad-
dition, by taking advantage of FAS No. 15 and by carefully struc-
turing debt reduction transactions, both the banks and the debtor
nations should be able to reach agreement on mutually beneficial
transactions.
F. U.S. Accounting Treatment of Debt Exchanges Under
the Brady Plan
1. FAS No. 15
In connection with the negotiations of various debt reduction
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agreements under the Brady Plan, the Securities and Exchange
Commission issued an analysis of proposed debt restructuring
transactions where banks would exchange existing debt for either a
new debt instrument at a discount and a market rate of interest or
a new debt instrument with the same face amount but a below
market rate of interest."9 The analysis assumed that under the pro-
posed transactions a) the quality of the restructured loans would
be enhanced, b) the principal of the new instruments would be due
in thirty years, and c) the funds for the collateral and support ar-
rangements would come from non-bank sources. The analysis
stated that both of the above transactions "must be accounted for
as 'troubled debt restructurings' "5 because they involve conces-
sions granted in a negotiated transaction where the same debtor!
creditor relationship survives and where such concessions are
granted due to the financial difficulties of the debtor. Therefore,
the analysis concluded, such transactions should be accounted for
under the rules of FAS No. 15 and the banks would not have to
recognize a loss assuming that the requirements of FAS No. 15 are
met.
2. Loan Loss Reserves
In order to provide an incentive to banks to provide new
money to LDC debtors, the Federal Reserve Board recently an-
nounced that no reserves will be required against new loans made
in the context of the Brady Plan. At this time it is still too early to
assess how significant an impact this will have on the U.S. creditor
banks' willingness to provide new money to LDC debtors.
G. U.S. Tax Treatment of Debt Reduction Transactions
Since the 1986 Tax Reform Act repealed Internal Revenue
Code Section 166(c) ,51 voluntary loan loss reserves are generally
not deductible. The commercial banks may only take a deduction
for the losses associated with their loans upon the actual realiza-
tion of the loss, that is when the debt has actually been exchanged
or sold for a loss. Whether or not the current tax law provides an
incentive or deterrence for banks to enter into debt reduction
49. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ACCOUNTING AND DISCLOSURE ISSUES IN-
VOLVED IN LDC DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS, STAFF MEMORANDUM (July 14, 1989).
50. Id. at 2.
51. See 26 U.S.C. § 166(c) (1982) (repealed 1986).
[Vol. 21:2
LDC DEBT REDUCTION
schemes is unclear. Some bankers have argued that if loan loss
reserves were deductible, banks would more readily accept the de-
valuation of assets that usually accompanies debt reduction deals.
Other bankers have argued, however, that because the current tax
law only allows a deduction upon the actual sale or exchange of
debt, the law provides an incentive for banks to actually consum-
mate a debt reduction transaction.
On May 22, 1989, the Internal Revenue Service issued Notice
89-58 dealing with the allocation and apportionment of loan losses
suffered by U.S. banks.5 2 This notice has encountered great opposi-
tion from U.S. banks. Notice 89-58 states that U.S. banks must
apportion their loan losses between U.S. and foreign source inter-
est income according to the tax book value asset method described
in Section 1.861-9T(g) of the Internal Revenue Regulations (i.e., a
bank must apportion its losses with respect to such loans between
foreign and U.S. income according to its ratio of foreign assets
(loans) to its overall assets (loans)).58 The effect of this notice is
that since foreign loan losses are linked to foreign income in a
strictly proportional method, the U.S. tax credits which the banks
can effectively use as the result of paying foreign taxes on their
foreign source interest income may be substantially reduced.
Under Section 901 of the Internal Revenue Code, when a U.S.
bank pays a foreign tax on its foreign source income, it receives a
tax credit that it may apply against its U.S. income tax.54 If the tax
rate of the foreign country is higher than the U.S. tax rate, as is
often the case, the greater the amount of taxes that the bank pays
in the foreign country and applies as tax credits for U.S. tax pur-
poses, the lower the bank's overall tax burden will be. The banks
can only use tax credits, however, up to an amount equal to their
foreign source income divided by their total income multiplied by
their U.S. taxes for that year.5
Before Notice 89-58, U.S. banks allocated substantial amounts
of their foreign loan losses to U.S. source income, so that their for-
eign source income was higher. Thus, the cap on the banks' tax
credits for U.S. income tax purposes was also higher. As a result of
Notice 89-58, U.S. banks are now restricted in their ability to allo-
cate loan losses to U.S. source income and thus are limited in their
52. I.R.S. Notice 89-58, 1989 C.B. 699.
53. Tres. Reg. §1.861-9T(g) (1989).
54. 26 U.S.C. § 901 (1988).
55. Id. § 904(a).
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ability to use increased foreign tax credits. This limitation may
therefore remove an incentive for U.S. banks to enter into debt
reduction schemes because large amounts of the losses resulting
from such schemes will be forced to be allocated to foreign sources.
Thus, not only may the banks realize financial losses as a result of
entering into debt reduction schemes but, due to Notice 89-58,
U.S. banks may also lose a substantial part of the tax benefits as-
sociated with the utilization of foreign tax credits.
V. CONCLUSION
As a result of having substantially increased their capital and
loan loss reserves during recent years, the commercial bank credi-
tors are in a much better position to absorb the losses inherent in
their LDC loan portfolios and, therefore, to aggressively manage
such portfolios. Thus, the banks are much freer to engage in debt/
equity conversions and debt securitization and collateralization
schemes similar to the Mexican Debt Exchange.
The Brady Plan has provided further encouragement to such
schemes as a means of effecting substantial LDC debt reduction.
The World Bank, the IMF, and Japan have also pledged their di-
rect financial assistance to help finance debt reduction schemes.
The degree of flexibility and the objectives of the banks in
dealing with their LDC debt portfolios differ greatly. Perhaps it is
unwise and impractical to seek an essentially single, common ap-
proach for all the banks to substantial debt reduction. Instead, if
the bank steering committees and the debtor nations cannot reach
a prompt agreement on an overall approach, perhaps such commit-
tees should let the market place develop a number of specific
transactions or schemes to deal with the particular needs of indi-
vidual banks and debtor nations. The development of innovative
debt reduction schemes will require a careful blending and balanc-
ing of the regulatory, accounting and tax environments affecting
the creditor banks with the cash flow and economic limitations of
the debtor nations.
The recent liberalization of Regulation K by the Federal Re-
serve Board has alleviated, to a certain extent, one of the regula-
tory hurdles to debt-equity conversions. Although debt-equity pro-
grams have recently been curtailed in a number of countries, debt-
equity conversions can be a powerful tool not only in reducing the
LDC debt burden, as Chile has demonstrated, but also as serving
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as an engine of growth in encouraging new capital investment.
Similarly, debt securitization and collateralization schemes can be
quite effective in reducing LDC debt burden while giving the
banks, especially those seeking an exit vehicle from LDC lending,
flexibility in determining whether to retain or liquidate their LDC
debt.
None of these techniques or others currently being developed,
standing alone, can be viewed as a "solution" to the LDC debt
problem. But, taken together and if not unduly restricted by gov-
ernment regulations, accounting rules and loan agreement provi-
sions, they can produce a significant reduction in the debt burden
to levels that the principal debtor nations should be able to man-
age comfortably. Hopefully, the U.S. Government, other OECD
governments, the World Bank, and the IMF can work together to
help the LDC nations and the commercial banks achieve sub-
stantial debt reduction through debt-equity conversions, debt
securitization and collateralization schemes, and other innovative
transactions.
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